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The differences between Professor Whitford's views' and mine are of
crucial importance to the law of products liability. Our objectives-indeed,
the objectives of all interested in the field-are similar: to identify policies
that, other things equal, will reduce the seriousness and frequency of inju-
ries suffered by consumers. Professor Whitford and I differ sharply, how-
ever, in our predictions of the empirical effects of modern products liabil-
ity policy. According to Professor Whitford, the policy adopted by courts
over the last twenty years-the expansion of manufacturer liability be-
yond that undertaken in warranties-is likely to have reduced the rate of
product defects.2 According to my investment theory,' on the other hand, if
consumer and manufacturer investments in safety are substitutes at the
margin, the expansion of manufacturer liability is likely to have increased
the rate of defects and the rate of consumer injuries.4 The vast number of
product-related injuries compels us to examine these different implications
very carefully. It is estimated that in 1977 alone, for example, consumers
in the United States suffered 36 million product-related injuries.'
Professor Whitford's criticism of my article rests upon a misunder-
standing of the nature of scientific reasoning. Whitford demands that my
investment theory, as a "complete" theory, explain every phenomenon as-
sociated with product warranties and directly refute every conceivable al-
ternative warranty theory.6 These requirements allow Whitford to confer
t Professor of Law, Yale University. I wish to thank Edward A. Dauer, Henry B. Hansmann,
Jerry L. Mashaw, and Kenneth I. Wolpin for comments on various aspects of this response. Support
for this paper was provided by the Civil Liability Program of Yale Law School for which I am very
grateful. I am responsible for errors.
1. Whitford, Comment on a Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 91 YALE L.J. 1371
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Whitford].
2. Whitford at pp. 1372, 1385.
3. See generally Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981)
[hereinafter cited by page number only].
4. Defects will increase because the expansion of manufacturer liability substitutes relatively more
costly manufacturer investments in safety for less costly consumer investments in safety. See pp. 1347-
51. The conditions under which such an effect will occur are quite general: when manufacturer and
consumer investments are strong substitutes at the margin.
5. PROD. SAP. & LIABIL. REP. (BNA) 511 (June 29, 1979) (reporting U.S. government estimate).
6. Whitford at pp. 1380, 1384.
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significance upon his assortment of "partial" theories, though he presents
no evidence supporting any of them, and to dismiss the investment theory,
though he acknowledges the substantial evidence supporting it. Whitford's
typology of theories is unique, and his standard of scientific proof is un-
realistic. I know of no scientific theory that has ever met such a standard,
and doubt that any theory ever will. More importantly, however, Whit-
ford's methodological strategem diverts attention from the empirical issue
dividing us that ought to be the central focus of product liability reform:
whether there is evidence that consumer and manufacturer investments in
optimizing productive services are substitutes over the range relevant to
legal liability. The answer to this question and to this question alone will
determine whether modern developments in products liability law have
increased or decreased the rate of product defects and injuries.
I. Whitford's Criticism and Its Failing
Whitford accepts the most important propositions of the investment the-
ory.7 He agrees that consumers invest in product care and the prevention
of defects.' He agrees that warranties constitute a form of product insur-
ance that pools consumers with different levels of risk.9 Thus, he accepts
the proposition that consumers whose expected losses are lower than aver-
age-such as the poor-are likely to prefer lower levels of warranty in-
surance.1" It follows simply that mandatory insurance is redistributive
and, with respect to the poor, regressively redistributive." Furthermore,
Whitford generously regards my investment theory explanations of differ-
ences in warranty terms among products as "on the whole plausible."'"
Indeed, Whitford concludes-though I had regarded the suggestion as ten-
tative"3-that consumer preferences influence warranty terms both
through the efforts of a set of informed shoppers 4 and through repeat
purchase decisions."
Whitford's objection, however, is that the investment theory does not
explain all phenomena related to product warranties. There exist other
theories, not intuitively implausible, that might explain other warranty
7. Indeed, Whitford claims that he first formulated the investment theory. Whitford at p. 1375 &
n.20. I will concede to Professor Whitford the originality of the investment theory if, after this ex-
change, he accepts its implications.
8. Id. at pp. 1371, 1377.
9. Id. at pp. 1377-78 & nn.28, 33, 36.
10. Id. at nn.33, 36.
11. See id. Professor Whitford qualifies this conclusion, correctly, for products purchased solely by
the poor.
12. Id. at pp. 1377.
13. Pp. 1346-47.
14. Whitford at pp. 1377, 1384.
15. Id.
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practices. 16 Whitford presents no new evidence supporting these theories,
nor does he attempt to reinterpret more than small bits of my data as
consistent with them. Instead, Whitford maintains that unless I can di-
rectly refute each of these "partial" theories, the investment theory, as a
"complete" theory, fails and can be rejected.'7 Whitford knows that there
are no available data that bear directly on some of these theories-for
example, data on the frequency of social contacts between the sales and
law departments of particular manufacturers, the level of education of
buyers of particular products, or the intensity with which corporate man-
agers fear warranty regulation."8 Whitford seems to believe that without
such data I cannot challenge these partial theories." Thus, Whitford dis-
misses the investment theory.20
Whitford misconceives the nature of scientific inquiry. All scientific the-
ories are abstractions and thus are necessarily "partial" rather than "com-
plete."'" The only question is whether a theory is a relevant abstraction. "2
A theory relevant to the evaluation of products liability law must address
the determinants of product safety. There are many practices related to
product warranties that have no influence on product safety and, thus, for
this purpose, can be ignored. I believe-and I shall explain why be-
low-that the investment theory identifies the principal determinants of
product safety. If it does, then the investment theory can predict the effects
of a change in the law on the rate of accidents, even though Whitford can
identify other factors related to warranty content that the investment the-
ory does not explain.
Professor Whitford's "social contacts" theory illustrates his lack of sen-
sitivity to this point. One of Whitford's "partial" theories, said to refute
the investment theory, is that differences in warranty provisions result
from different "personal relationships" among the members of a firm's
sales department or its chief executive officer and its lawyers. 23 It is not
implausible as a general matter that social and professional relationships
within a firm affect to some extent the firm's policies and decisions. Such
relationships, for example, might reduce the cost of transferring informa-
tion between one division and another or may make the firm's policies and
16. Id. at p. 1380.
17. Id. at pp. 1378-79, 1380.
18. Id. at pp. 1380-83.
19. Id. at p. 1384 (by inference). Whitford's discussion of his various partial theories makes no
reference to the relevant data contained in my article. Id. at pp. 1380-84.
20. Id. at p. 1384-85.
21. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); Kuhn, The
Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION 178 (1977);
Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953).
22. See Kuhn, The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science, supra note 21, at 178.
23. Whitford at pp. 1381-82.
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activities more coherent or uniform.24
The important question for social policy, however, is whether social
contacts within a firm significantly influence product safety. Most people
believe that the rate of product defects is more substantially influenced by
legal rules that define the responsibilities of manufacturers for product-
related losses than by the extent to which the firm's officers are "close
socially." Thus, individuals concerned about product injuries have tended
to concentrate their efforts on law reform rather than, say, on the foster-
ing of more congenial social atmospheres within firms. In other words, the
vast majority of commentators have regarded "personal relationships,"
however important to the explanation of other behavior of the firm, as
irrelevant to the rate of product injuries. Of course, these commentators
(including myself) may be wrong. Yet I know of no studies relating prod-
uct injuries to social contacts. And Whitford presents no evidence support-
ing the social contacts theory,2" or even supporting his view that social
contacts are empirically relevant to the rate of product defects. The "social
contacts" theory is no more than a hunch.26
Professor Whitford's other partial theories are subject to a similar ob-
jection. Whitford discusses these theories only in terms of their intuitive
plausibility and the evidence necessary to directly test them.27 All must
agree with Whitford that these theories possess some degree of plausibil-
ity. But according to Whitford's view of scientific method, such a conces-
sion amounts to a complete victory for his approach. To Whitford, a par-
tial theory with no more than an air of plausibility and an absence of
direct refutation defeats what he calls a "complete" theory.28 This ex-
plains why Whitford devotes such substantial effort to characterizing the
investment theory as "complete" '29 (although sometimes he hedges, calling
it "predominant" or more comprehensive).3" This standard is unknown to
24. These explanations, incidentally, in no way undermine the cost-based investment theory.
25. Whitford does claim that warranty provisions disclaiming personal injury liability in legal
regimes in which such disclaimers are unenforceable may reflect the influence of social contacts. Whit-
ford at pp. 1381-82. There were no such provisions in the warranties of my sample, however. Whit-
ford also asserts that the exclusion of consequential damages in dryer warranties, but not in range
warranties, may be explained by the organizational structure of manufacturers. Id. at p. 1381. Whit-
ford presents no evidence supporting this assertion. A more likely (but equally hypothetical) explana-
tion, consistent with the investment theory, is that the dryer exclusion is intended to deny recovery for
heat damage to clothing, particularly synthetics. More careful consumers may not want coverage of
such losses. There is no clearly comparable property damage from excessive range heat; personal
injury losses, of course, are non-excludable.
26. The implications of the social contacts theory are unclear. Are firms with closer social contacts
expected to offer more generous warranties, or less safe products, or simply more legalistic
warranties?
27. See Whitford at pp. 1378-84.
28. Id. at pp. 1380-81 (by inference); p. 1384.
29. Id. at pp. 1374-76 & n.19.
30. Id. at p. 1376 & n.23.
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modern science. Was Darwin ever able to refute the theory of the divine
origin of species?
Grappling with a typology of theories misses the point. The only useful
way to evaluate a theory is to confront it with evidence." Thus, the only
issue relevant to products liability policy is whether the investment theory
or any other theory (including those of Professor Whitford) best explains
the available evidence of the determinants of product safety. My article
presents data, which had not been previously available, of the product
defect policies embodied in the warranties of individual firms in a wide set
of consumer product industries. 2 These warranties define the legal obliga-
tions of manufacturers and consumers in the event of product loss. Al-
though they provide no direct evidence of the accident rate, they do indi-
cate how manufacturers and consumers allocate responsibility between
themselves for the prevention of defects and injuries, which is inferential
evidence of the determinants of the accident rate. Currently, there is no
direct evidence of the effect of products liability law on the accident rate
and there is no better data of the determinants of product safety. Thus,
the data in my article provide our best current opportunity to address this
important question of public policy.
Furthermore, these data are sufficiently detailed to test Professor Whit-
ford's theories. Professor Whitford seems to believe that his theories can
only be refuted with direct evidence, such as evidence of the level of buyer
education or of manufacturer fear of regulation. Whitford, however, has
not examined the data in my article with adequate care. The article in-
cludes substantial evidence bearing on Whitford's theories. What does the
evidence show?
II. The Theories and the Evidence Supporting Them
In my view, the data presented in my article suggest strongly that man-
ufacturer and consumer investments in productive services are substitutes
at the margin and that warranty provisions are designed to influence the
level of care that manufacturers and consumers invest in products. Profes-
sor Whitford does not contest or attempt to reinterpret the vast bulk of
these data. For example, parts provisions in warranties place liability on
consumers by limiting coverage of or excluding liability for parts that are
31. This assumes only that the theory has testable implications-a theory without such implica-
tions is no theory at all.
32. 1 surveyed the warranties of 16 product groups: cookware, refrigerators, freezers, gas ranges,
electric ranges, washers, dryers, air conditioners, color televisions, stereos, automobiles, recreational
vehicles, coaches, truck mounts, travel trailers, and mobile homes. The warranties were provided by
the Federal Trade Commission. See pp. 1319-20 & n.109 for further description of the data.
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most vulnerable to rough or careless consumer use." Other parts provi-
sions place liability on manufacturers by granting coverage more extensive
than normal for parts whose performance seems affected primarily by
manufacturer investments, parts that are inaccessible to consumers and
least likely to be affected by consumer use.14 Many warranties exclude
coverage of losses from consumer behavior that subjects a product to a
higher likelihood of damage (such as the use of a recreational vehicle by a
club or group, hauling trailers or heavy loads, high speed acceleration or
gear-shifting). The duration of warranty coverage, disclaimers of
merchantability and exclusions of consequential damages are correlated
with these specific provisions, further suggesting variations among con-
sumers in their use and care of these products."
Again, for the most part, Professor Whitford does not contest the invest-
ment theory interpretation of these data. Instead, he defends two theories
that my article shows as explaining very little, and proposes four new
additional theories of warranty behavior. Let us inquire-as Whitford
might have done-whether his theories can explain consistently the phe-
nomena within their scope.
A. Whitford's Consumer Misperception Theories
Three theories that Whitford defends-two new theories and the signal
theory that my article examines-address the influence of consumer de-
mand on warranty coverage, in particular, the influence of consumer per-
ceptions. One of Whitford's theories predicts that products sold to con-
sumers with less education or less experience will provide less extensive
warranty coverage, a theory that Whitford views as consistent with find-
ings that the poor pay higher prices for products than the middle class. 7
A second of Whitford's theories proposes that warranty content is affected
by consumer decisions that "overdiscount long-term risks." 8 Possibly
Whitford means that consumers are risk-preferrers 9 A more attractive
way of putting the point is that consumers fail to understand or to calcu-
33. Pp. 1328-30.
34. Pp. 1330-31. According to the theory, consumers may affect parts indirectly by the volume
and intensity of their use of the product. Pp. 1315-16. Thus, the theory explains why parts shielded
from direct consumer contact are nonetheless warranted for periods much less than the average ex-
pected service life. P. 1327 & Table 4; see also infra p. 1395.
35. Pp. 1333-35. It is less clear under the law than under the warranty whether such uses are
reasonable, contrary to Professor Whitford's suggestion that the law efficiently precludes recovery
unless the product is "defective." Whitford at p. 1385.
36. Pp. 1343-46.
37. Whitford at pp. 1380-81 Professor Whitford acknowledges that modern research on relative
prices to the poor explains observed price differentials in terms of real distribution costs.
38. Id. at p. 1384.
39. For a similar argument, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 135-37 (1977).
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late properly long-term risks, and consequently they demand less war-
ranty coverage than they would if they were fully informed.40
The signal theory is a more general statement of the same approach.
Because information about product quality is costly to obtain, consumers
are never fully informed. Warranties lower the information costs of prod-
uct quality, and hence warranty terms ought to be correlated with the
quality of underlying product characteristics. 41 Whitford's two theories ob-
viously are only special cases of the signal theory addressing particular
sources of costly information although, perhaps, suggesting different corre-
lations between product quality and warranty content.
It is certainly plausible a priori that some consumers have difficulty
evaluating long-term risks and obtaining information about product dura-
bility, and that some consumers, of course, are poorly educated. It is also
plausible that such deficiencies may influence the extent to which such
consumers consider and understand warranty terms when making their
purchases. Indeed, my article suggests that consumer information costs ac-
count for the existence of warranties, 42 although these costs do not explain
differences among products in warranty terms. The crucial question for
public policy, however, is whether information deficiencies of this nature
are important at the margin. That is, are information deficiencies impor-
tant determinants of how manufacturers and consumers allocate responsi-
bility for safety-related precautions?
The article presents three types of evidence relevant to this question,
each based on variations in the provisions of the sample warranties. The
data reveal variations in the content of warranties of different products, in
the treatment of different characteristics of the same product, and in the
relationship between warranty content and measures of product d urabil-
ity. These variations indicate different ways that firms allocate responsi-
bility between manufacturers and consumers for safety-related precau-
tions. Thus, if information deficiencies are determinants of these
allocations, the observed variations ought to be related in some consistent
way to information deficiencies. Whitford insists, of course, that no single
hypothesis of his (as opposed to, of mine) must explain all warranty vari-
ations, 43 and I will accept his standard for now. Surely, however, it is fair
to insist, once the specific information deficiency is defined, that for each
hypothesis one should observe consistent results for those aspects of the
40. This interpretation is preferable because it avoids the problems of paternalism.
41. Pp. 1303-07 (further discussion of implications and evidence supporting signal theory).
42. Pp. 1309-10. I describe warranties as providing a performance bond of the manufacturer
equal to the value of expected repair costs during the warranty period. Consumers demand a perform-
ance bond because prior to purchase they cannot costlessly obtain information about the durability
and reliability of the product.
43. Whitford at pp. 1380, 1384.
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warranties or of the products themselves that fall within the scope of the
deficiency.
Table 1 rank orders the different products of the sample according to
the principal provisions of their warranties (most generous at the top,
least generous at the bottom). Column (1) shows that warranty duration
is longer for freezers, air conditioners, washers, and refrigerators than for
dryers, color televisions, electric and gas ranges and automobiles (in that
order). Column (2) indicates the extent to which the different product
warranties incorporate the principal exclusions: the disclaimer of
merchantability, the exclusion of consequential damages and the limitation
of coverage to the original purchaser. Column (3) shows the proportion of
warranties that exclude transport costs, a provision that Professor Whit-
ford believes is particularly reflective of information deficiencies."
Table 1: Warranty Provisions by Product, 1974,
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According to Whitford's misperception hypotheses, the differences in
the warranty provisions of these products may be related to the level of
consumer education, to the propensity of consumers to overdiscount risks
or to the general costliness of information. Are any of these hypotheses
plausible? Table 1 shows great inconsistency in the relative generosity of
the warranty provisions of individual products. Only automobile warran-
ties appear in a consistent position on the lists (near the bottom), sug-
gesting under Whitford's misperception theories that automobile purchas-
ers are relatively less educated or informed." To be fair to Professor
Whitford, his theories allow for the possibility that consumers have more
information about some warranty provisions than others. But to accept
even this (nearly tautological) version of the misperception hypotheses, it
is necessary to believe, for example, that consumers of freezers are well
educated or informed about the duration of coverage and the general ex-
clusions, but poorly educated or informed about the transport exclusion.
In contrast, consumers of gas ranges must be poorly educated or informed
about the duration of coverage, but well educated or informed about ex-
clusions, particularly the transport exclusion. Purchasers of dryers must
be educated or informed at the middle range about warranty duration and
transport costs, but poorly educated or informed about the general exclu-
sions. Unfortunately, these propositions collectively seem contradictory.
The sample warranties also show variations in the coverage of different
product characteristics. Some product parts, for example, are given ex-
tended warranty coverage; other parts are excluded from coverage. Is this
evidence consistent with any of the misperception hypotheses? To accept
the misperception hypotheses it would be necessary to believe, for exam-
ple, that consumers of refrigerators, freezers or air conditioners are well
educated or informed about the compressor and sealed refrigeration sys-
tems of these products (for which five-year coverage is typically offered),
but poorly educated or informed about the exterior finish, plastic parts,
gasket and fuses (which, typically, are excluded from coverage). Similarly,
purchasers of washing machines would have to be well educated or in-
formed about the product's transmission (typically, five-year coverage),
but poorly educated or informed about light bulbs and porcelain (typi-
cally, excluded). Oddly, these propositions suggest that consumers are bet-
ter educated or informed about the internal mechanical parts of these
products than about the exterior parts obvious to any inspection. This is a
45. According to the investment theory, on the other hand, automobile warranties are shorter in
duration and incorporate a greater number of exclusions because of greater differences between auto-
mobile consumers in terms of the uses to which they put the product or the damages that they might
suffer. See pp. 1333, 1334, 1338, 1345-46.
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very peculiar form of information deficiency.46
The evidence most difficult to reconcile with the consumer mispercep-
tion hypotheses, however, is the relationship between basic warranty cov-
erage (column (1)) and service-life expectancy (column (4)). My article
demonstrates that there is no clear correspondence between warranty du-
ration and service-life expectancy,47 as clear a refutation as is possible of
the one central implication of the signal theory. Professor Whitford ig-
nores this evidence, 48 but it is equally damaging to his various mispercep-
tion theories. Is it plausible that purchasers of automobiles overdiscount
the risk of future repairs to demand one year of warranty coverage, but
properly discount auto durability to demand 9.4 years of service-life? Are
consumers of refrigerators so poorly educated or informed about warran-
ties as to be given only one-or five-year coverage, but so well educated or
informed about product durability that manufacturers must give them a
machine that operates for 15.2 years? The disparity between basic war-
ranty coverage and service-life expectancy is equally extreme for the other
products: gas ranges--year warranty, 13.5 year service-life; dryers-I-
year warranty, 13.7 year service-life; color televisions-I -year warranty,
12.0 year service-life; freezers-5-year warranty, 20.4 year service-life.
These differences cannot be explained by differential perceptions, educa-
tion or experience. 49 The perceptions of consumers of the need for future
product repair and their perceptions of product service-life must be very
closely related. To explain the data, Professor Whitford would have to
claim that there are separate and independent determinants of each set of
perceptions.
Whitford repeatedly insists that his theories are "partial" and must not
be called upon to explain every observation. But a credible hypothesis
46. According to the investment theory, parts excluded from coverage tend to be those either easily
breakable or sensitive to different treatment by consumers. Parts given extended coverage are those
housed deep within the product, often protected by padding and bracing, and thus less susceptible to
damage from rough handling short of misuse. See pp. 1329-31.
47. Pp. at 1326-27.
48. Indeed, Professor Whitford grossly misinterprets my findings when he states that my data
"offer significant support for the principal hypothesis of signal theory." Whitford at p. 1379. Here
Whitford refers to the post hoc signal theory implication of uniform one-year warranty coverage. The
page to which Whitford refers for the theory's "substantial support" reads: "The warranties of my
sample show substantial variation from the uniformity predicted by the signal theory." P. 1339. At
this sentence I describe findings showing that one-year coverage of all parts and labor expenses is
offered by only 12 of 62 sample warranties: 9 automobile warranties, 1 appliance warranty, and 2
mobile home warranties. P. 1339 n.175.
49. The disparity between warranty coverage and service-life expectancy provides strong support
for the investment theory. Warranty coverage expires when differences among consumers in their
investments to prolong product life become significant. Thus, low-risk consumers find longer coverage
worth less than its average cost and are sufficient in number to dominate the warranty market. The
disparity supports the proposition that manufacturer and consumer investments are strong substitutes
at the margin. See supra note 4. I know of no other theory, however partial, that can coherently
explain this disparity. See infra pp. 1399-1400.
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must explain some set of observations consistently." However plausible
the general notion that consumers are poorly informed, is there reason to
believe that for some products they are less informed about the exclusion
of consequential damages than about the exclusion of transport costs; that
consumers are ignorant with respect to warranty coverage but sophisti-
cated with respect to product durability? It seems impossible to define a
credible set of consumer perceptions that explains the variations in war-
ranty coverage in Table 1. Whitford rests on individual examples-the
exclusion of transport charges seen in one set of product warranties," the
disclaimer of merchantability seen in another set 52 -which he claims may
relate to information deficiencies. But the modesty of Whitford's claims
cannot justify a promiscuous selection from among the data.
B. Whitford's Market Power Theories
Whitford's final two theories address the relationship between warranty
content and manufacturers' bargaining power. My article found little evi-
dence in support of the exploitation theory, according to which manufac-
turers exercise bargaining power superior to consumers by offering one-
sided warranties.5 3 Whitford defends the exploitation theory by accusing
me of misrepresenting it. 4 He also suggests an alternative market power
hypothesis that turns the exploitation theory on its head. Whitford em-
phasizes that at the time the warranties in my sample were issued, Con-
gress was considering warranty regulation. According to Whitford, firms
in concentrated industries-the automobile manufacturers in particu-
lar-were likely to have been fearful of government regulation of their
warranties, and thus may have offered relatively more generous warranty
coverage than firms in unconcentrated industries."s
Let me first address the fear-of-regulation theory. Whitford is certainly
correct that in 1974, when the sample warranties were issued, Congress
had before it the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which it enacted in
1975.56 Whitford is also correct that automobile warranties were a special
focus of the hearings and studies commissioned by Congress prior to en-
actment.5 7 Whitford's history, however, is incomplete. 8 Congress had con-
50. Indeed, to avoid tautology, a credible "partial" theory must provide a coherent explanation of
why it addresses only some portion of the observed phenomena. None of Whitford's partial theories
meet this standard.
51. Whitford at p. 1378.
52. Id. at pp. 1381-82.
53. Pp. 1290-1302, 1320-25.
54. Whitford at p. 1379 & nn.20, 30.
55. Id. at p. 1383.
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
57. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON AUTOMOBILE WARRANTIES (1970).
58. For an extended discussion of the Act's history, see Priest, The Regulation of Product War-
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sidered warranty bills indistinguishable in substance from the Magnuson-
Moss Act since 1967.'9 Professor Whitford acknowledges that the
Magnuson-Moss Act does not incorporate substantive regulation of war-
ranty content to any great extent;6' neither did any of the earlier bills.6
Thus, what had the manufacturers to fear? Further, automobile warran-
ties were only one of the subjects of particular congressional concern. Sen-
ator Magnuson's 1967 bill applied not only to the warranties of the highly
concentrated automobile industry, but also to the warranties of the various
appliance groups, 62 which are either moderately concentrated or uncon-
centrated. More generally, Whitford does not explain why a single firm
would sacrifice profits by offering an excessively generous warranty to
protect the future returns of other firms and industries (including its com-
petitors) potentially subject to the regulation. A concerted agreement to
offer excessive coverage would seem necessary.
Let us, however, put aside these questions about the plausibility of
Whitford's theory and look to the evidence. Unfortunately, the evidence
does not show that the more concentrated industries offer the more gener-
ous warranties. 63 It shows that there is no clear relationship of any kind
between warranty content and either industry concentration or firm mar-
ket share.6 Thus, there is no more evidence for the hypothesis that con-
centrated industries offer relatively greater coverage than for the conflict-
ing exploitation hypothesis that firms with greater market power65 offer
relatively lower coverage.
Furthermore, there is no support for Whitford's more specific asser-
tions. Whitford predicts that automobile warranties will be more generous
than average because they were the subject of special congressional scru-
ranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (unpublished manuscript on file with Yale Law
Journal), reprinted in part in Priest, The Structure and Operation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act, in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970 at 246 (Clarkson & Muris eds. 1980).
59. See S. 2726-28, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 35,278-84 (1967). A revised version of
Senator Magnuson's 1967 bill was passed by the Senate in 1970, S. 3074, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 116
CONG. REC. 22,487 (1970), and again in 1971, S. 986, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 39,876
(1971), although it failed to gain House approval both times. Congressional support for some federal
legislation, however, was strong. The 1971 version of the Senate bill passed by a vote of 72-2. Id.
60. Whitford at p. 1382 n.40. I have shown the minimal effect of the Act on product warranties
in Priest, The Structure and Operation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, supra note 58.
61. See Priest, The Regulation of Product Warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
supra note 58, at 3.
62. See supra note 59.
63. A study cited by Whitford claims to show that larger firms offer more generous warranties.
This inference, however, is inappropriate because the study measures firm size by dollar sales volume.
Thus, a firm that sells one $8000 mobile home appears "larger" than a firm that sells forty $195
televisions. Obviously, more careful measure of relative sizes within industries is necessary. See Note,
An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1979).
64. Pp. 1321-25 & Tables 1-3.
65. See infra pp. 1399-1400 (definition of market power).
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tiny." Table 1 shows that the automobile warranties in 1974 were among
the least generous in coverage. Of course, fear is a subjective response. But
to accept Whitford's theory one must believe that manufacturers in each
of the seven product groups67 listed in Table 1 plus two additional product
groups discussed in the article68 were more fearful of warranty regulation
than the auto manufacturers, even though the concentration level of each
of these nine industries was significantly lower than that of the automobile
industry.6
An additional datum: one group of manufacturers whose warranties
were studied in the article-the mobile home manufacturers-had special
reason to fear warranty regulation in 1974. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion began an investigation of mobile home warranty practices in 1972.0
In 1974, when my sample warranties were issued, four major mobile
home manufacturers had been threatened with actions under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.7 In addition, the Commission's Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection was in the process of drafting a report of its
investigation. Consent decrees were entered in each of the four actions in
March, 1975,72 and the Bureau issued its final report in November,
1975." The report excoriated the mobile home industry for its exploitative
warranty behavior and proposed a Trade Regulation Rule subjecting mo-
bile home manufacturers to detailed substantive regulation of warranty
performance.74 The regulations proposed in the Trade Rule are far more
detailed and intrusive than those of the Magnuson-Moss Act. Is there evi-
dence of fear in mobile home warranties? Unfortunately for Professor
Whitford's hypothesis, mobile home warranties are among the least gener-
ous of the sample in terms of both duration of coverage and exclusions.
They are only slightly more generous than the auto warranties.75
66. Whitford at n.40.
67. I count only 7 rather than 8 product groups in Table I on the assumption of a relatively high
cross-elasticity of demand between electric and gas ranges. In my article I treated electric and gas
ranges as separate markets to err in favor of the exploitation theory. Pp. 1322 (Table 1), 1323 (Table
2), & 1325 (Table 3).
68. Mobile homes and travel trailers. See p. 1325 (Table 3).
69. In 1974 the four-firm concentration ratio for automobiles was 100%; gas ranges 75%; washers,
73%; electric ranges, 73%; dryers, 73%; refrigerators, 72%; freezers, 71%; color televisions, 60%; air
conditioners, 59%; travel trailers, 33%; mobile homes, 29%. Id.
70. See De Alessi, Regulating Post Purchase Regulations: Mobile Homes, in THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970, at 204 (Clarkson & Muris eds. 1980).
71. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
72. Redman Indus., 85 F.T.C. 309 (1975); Fleetwood Enterprises, 85 F.T.C. 414 (1975); Skyline
Corp., 85 F.T.C. 444 (1975); Commodore Corp., 85 F.T.C. 472 (1975).
73. Staff Statement of Position, Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Regarding Mobile Home Sales
and Service, Federal Trade Commission (Nov. 11, 1975), cited in De Alessi, supra note 70, at 347
n.4.
74. Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, Mobile Home Sales and Service, 40 Fed. Reg. 23,334-40
(1977).
75. P. 1325 (Table 3). According to the investment theory, mobile home warranties offer rela-
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Finally, Whitford defends the authors of the exploitation theory, which
provides that manufacturers will exercise superior bargaining power by
drafting one-sided warranties. My article challenges this theory by show-
ing that there is no relationship between warranty content and market
power measured in two separate ways: individual firm market share, and
industry concentration.76 Whitford does not reinterpret my data or report
new data." Instead, Whitford accuses me of misinterpreting the work of
the exploitation theorists. None of those theorists, Whitford asserts, ex-
plicitly claim a precise relationship between warranty content and either
market share or concentration.18
Here, I suppose, Whitford is right. None of the exploitation theorists
did define a clear relationship between market share and warranty con-
tent. The discussion in the exploitation literature of market power or bar-
gaining power was (and remains today79) impressionistic and imprecise.8 0
The exploitation theorists assert unmistakably that manufacturers exploit
superior bargaining power." I attempted, as fairly as I could, to introduce
some rigor to such statements in order to generate implications that would
allow the theory to be tested. The implications are straightforward. Mar-
ket share and industry concentration are common and widely accepted
measures of market power in the context of antitrust law.82 Are there bet-
ter (non-tautological) measures of market power?
Whitford's dismay over the use of such measures, however, can be read-
ily appreciated. Most of us, I would imagine, share some intuitive feeling
that manufacturers possess bargaining power superior to any consumer
and that consumers have few opportunities to choose among warranty
terms. This feeling accounts, I believe, for the popularity of the contract-
of-adhesion and unfair bargaining power concepts in modern jurispru-
dence. When the intuition is restated rigorously, however-as a relation-
ship between market share or industry concentration and warranty con-
tent-its imprecision becomes more obvious. Market share and
concentration suggest the importance of general competitive conditions,
which certainly differ among industries. Our intuitions, in contrast, do not
tively limited coverage because mobile homes, like automobiles, are susceptible to widely different uses
by consumers. Thus, consumers who use mobile homes relatively less intensively demand lower war-
ranty coverage.
76. Pp. 1320-25.
77. Whitford restates the exploitation hypothesis in terms of the lack of consumer information.
Whitford at pp. 1380, 1384. 1 have addressed this theory above. See supra pp. 1393-1396.
78. Id. at p. 1378 & nn.20, 29, 32.
79. See, e.g., Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1974)
(modern version of exploitation idea).
80. See pp. 1299-1302 (discussing exploitation literature).
81. Whitford himself discusses the authorities who make this suggestion. Whitford at p. 1378
n.29. I discuss the exploitation literature at pp. 1299-1302.
82. I present both four-firm and Herfindahl index measures. Pp. 1322-25 (Tables 1-3).
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commonly incorporate a concentration index. In addition, the more careful
definition of the problem raises questions of industrial behavior: Why does
the offer of one-sided warranty terms generate greater profits than a mo-
nopoly price? What is the relationship between a manufacturer's invest-
ment in warranty coverage and its investment in other product character-
istics? Why does a manufacturer that possesses superior bargaining power
offer an exploitative warranty while providing a product with a 13- to 15-
year service-life expectancy? Questions of this nature are routine in anti-
trust analysis (perhaps because it builds upon a stronger empirical base),
but virtually unknown in contracts or products liability law although the
underlying issues are the same."' The exploitation theory of warranties
does not and, I believe, cannot answer these questions.
If I have distorted the approach of the exploitation theorists, it is "dis-
tortion" that comes from the sharpened focus of any careful, scientific
study. Upon closer view, a flat world becomes round, and the Martian
canals are shown to be illusions. The brilliant and moving calls of Profes-
sor Kessler in 1943 and of Professor Leff in 197084 to the attack on in-
completely bargained contracts provoked sympathy in many of us in the
contracts field. Their ideas have dominated our thinking about contractual
relations, especially between manufacturer and consumer, and have trans-
formed the law of products liability. 5 Unfortunately, the suppositions
upon which their ideas are based are unsupported by the evidence. The
time has come for a new view of the world.
III. The Most Informed Judgment of the Effects of Products Liability
Law
In my view, given the evidence available of the determinants of product
safety, the expansion of manufacturer liability for product defects86 has
83. But see Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power. Post-Benthamite Eco-
nomics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1976). Another example of unfamiliarity
with simple ideas of industrial organization is Professor Whitford's discussion of warranties as barri-
ers to entry. Whitford at p. 1383. Virtually all discussions of barriers to entry focus upon different
opportunities (costs, profits) between entering firms and firms currently in the market. See J. BAIN,
BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 5 (1956); Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47
(1981). The barrier identified by Professor Whitford-generous warranty coverage offered by current '
firms which must be matched by entering firms-does not suggest either a differential cost or profit
and would not qualify as a barrier to entry under the common definition.
84. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629 (1943); Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 131 (1970).
85. See pp. 1299-1302.
86. Whitford also complains that I misunderstand the law of products liability. He emphasizes
that a court may define "defect" and the "cause" of an injury in a manner that incorporates "least-
cost avoider" concepts. Whitford at pp. 1376, 1385. Thus, Whitford suggests, apparently under the
influence of Professor Posner's efficiency-of-the-law hypothesis, that strict liability and negligence re-
gimes adopt efficient standards of care. See also R. POSNER, supra note 39, at 25-191. I am very
skeptical of this belief. See Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, S. CAL. L. REV. (forth-
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probably increased the rate of product defects. Like all scientific judg-
ments, I must emphasize its tentative nature. I do not believe that I have
proven such an effect. My data, while the best available, are admittedly
incomplete and only of inferential value.
My judgment is based upon the implications of the investment theory,
which provides the best explanation of the data currently available. The
two major warranty theories that I examine in my article-the exploita-
tion theory and the signal theory-explain very little despite their influ-
ence and broad acceptance. Professor Whitford's four partial theories, to
my mind, explain even less. Whitford, in a concluding section, proposes to
rescue his theories with statistical technique. He suggests stringing to-
gether his six theories with my investment theory, and then applying re-
gression analysis to determine the relative importance of each. 7 This con-
fuses the variables identified by a theory with the theory itself. My theory
conflicts with Whitford's theories, and the conflict cannot be reconciled by
statistical manipulation. The principal purpose of scientific endeavor is to
define and sharpen a theory until it conflicts with some currently accepted
theory. A common, contrasting method in some social sciences is to at-
tempt to describe some phenomenon in all of its complexity, invoking one
partial theory or another as the observed phenomenon requires.88 This
approach, to be sure, presents a picture that is more complete. But it dulls
our critical abilities instead of sharpening them.
The conflict between Professor Whitford and me must not be smoothed
over. It should define the research agenda for studies of products liability
law. I am currently attempting to obtain more complete and direct data of
the effects of modern products liability law, but to date no better data
have been found. I challenge Professor Whitford and others to find better
data as well-data sufficiently detailed to support or cast doubt on our
modern theories of product warranties.
coming 1982). Even if true, the article criticizes standards under either negligence or strict liability
regimes in which courts substitute their judgment for the terms of the warranty contract. Whitford's
remarks seem to miss this crucial point.
87. Whitford at p. 1384.
88. See, e.g., Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile
Warranty, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 1006.
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